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NOTES
Contract Law: As Clear as Mud: The Demise of the
Covenant Not to Compete in Oklahoma
L Introduction
Covenants not to compete, and in particular, employment covenants not to
compete, have provided a steady stream of confusing and uncertain litigation since
early Medieval courts and Parliament began to address these contracts.1 In the 2001
legislative session, the Oklahoma legislature amended Oklahoma law on employment
covenants not to compete in an attempt to resolve the confusion surrounding these
types of contracts. This legislation is embodied in title 15, sections 217 and 219A of
the Oklahoma Statutes, and the amendments read as follows:
§ 217 Restraint of Trade Void
Every contract by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful
profession, trade or business of any kind, otherwise than as provided by
Sections 218 and 219 of this title, or otherwise than as provided by
Section 2 of this act, is to that extent void.
§ 219A Non-Compete Employment Contracts
A. A person who makes an agreement with an employer, whether in
writing or verbally, not to compete with the employer after, the
employment relationship has been terminated, shall be permitted to
engage in the same business as that conducted by the former employer
or in a similar business as that conducted by the former employer as
long as the former employee does not directly solicit the sale of goods,
services or a combination of goods and services from the established
customers of the former employer.
B. Any provision in a contract between an employer and an employee
in conflict with the provisions of this section shall be void and unenfor-
ceable.2
While the new amendments do not affect sections 218 or 219 of title 15, which
provide exceptions to the prohibition on restrictive covenants for the sale of the
goodwill of a business' and the dissolution of a partnership, ' respectively, the new
1. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625, 626 (1960).
2. 15 OKLA. STAT. §§ 217, 219A (2001) (amendments italicized). Only South Dakota's statutory
law on covenants not to compete also specifically allows non-solicitation agreements while disallowing
general covenants not to compete. See S.D. CoDnmE LAWS § 53-9-11 (Michie 2002) ("An employee
may agree with an employer.., not to solicit existing customers of the employer ... .
3. Section 218 reads:
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amendments, and section 219A in particular, make several important changes to
Oklahoma's law on noncompetitive covenants' between employers and employees.'
Senator Glenn Coffee (R-District 30) and Representative Raymond Vaughn (R-
District 81) introduced the current amendments, bundled together with several other
measures, on February 5, 2001.' This was not, however, Representative Vaughn's
first involvement with the issue of restrictive covenants. His involvement dates back
to 1999, when he represented an employee who was facing what Vaughn believed
to be the negative effects of a covenant not to compete The case, Loewen Group
Acquisition Corp. v. Matthews,' discussed fully infra, brought to Vaughn's attention
the great uncertainty and unfairness that could result under the then-current state of
Oklahoma law.'"
Following a successful disposition of the case, Representative Vaughn first
attempted to pass an amendment clarifying title 15, section 217 in February 2000."
One who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from
carrying on a similar business within a specified county and any county or counties
contiguous thereto, or a specified city or town or any part thereof, so long as the buyer,
or any person deriving title to the goodwill from him carries on a like business therein.
Provided, that any such agreement which is otherwise lawful but which exceeds the
territorial limitations specified by this section may be deemed valid, but only within the
county comprising the primary place of the conduct of the subject business and within any
counties contiguous thereto.
IS OKLA. STAT. § 218 (2001).
4. Section 219 reads:
Partners may, upon or in anticipation of a dissolution of the partnership, agree that none
of them will carry on a similar business within a specified county and any county or
counties contiguous thereto, or a specified city or town or any part thereof. Provided, that
any such agreement which is otherwise lawful but which exceeds the territorial limitations
specified by this section may be deemed valid, but only within the county comprising the
primary place of the conduct of the business of the subject partnership and within any
counties contiguous thereto.
Id. § 219.
5. Throughout this note, the terms "covenants in restraint of trade," "covenants not to compete,"
"noncompetitive covenants," and "restrictive covenants" will be used interchangeably. A covenant not
to compete is a contract in which one party agrees not to engage in certain activities that are in
competition with another party, usually a former employer. Gerald T. Laurie & David A. Harbeck,
Balancing Business Protection with the Freedom to Work: A Review of Noncompete Agreements in
Minnesota, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 107, 108 (1997).
6. 15 OKLA. STAT. §§ 217-219A (2001). Sections 218 and 219 provide exceptions to the ban on
noncompete agreements for the sale of the goodwill of a business and the dissolution of a partnership,
respectively. These sections are beyond the scope of this note; however, for case law on section 218 see
Farren v. Autoviable Serv., Inc., 1973 OK 4, 508 P.2d 646; Clare v. Palmer, 1949 OK 8, 203 P.2d 426;
Herrington v. Hackler, 1937 OK 720, 74 P.2d 388; Hartman v. Everett, 1932 OK 460, 12 P.2d 543. For
case law on section 219 see Brown v. Stough, 1956 OK 3, 292 P.2d 176; Moore v. Snodgress, 1950 OK
203, 223 P.2d 1080; Hulen v. Earel, 1903 OK 76, 73 P. 927.
7. Oklahoma Legislature Homepage, Status of Measures, History, 2001 Regular Session, Measure
Numbers: SB662, at http://www.lsb.state.ok.us/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
8. Interview with Representative Raymond A. Vaughn, House Sponsor of SB 662, in Edmond,
Okla. (Oct. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Vaughn Interview].
9. 2000 OK CIV APP 109, 12 P.3d 977.
10. Vaughn Interview, supra note 8.




This bill, cosponsored by Senator Mark Snyder (R-District 41), met with an
interesting and somewhat historic demise. After passing the House Judiciary
Committee, a general vote of the House, and the Senate Judiciary Committee without
a single vote cast against the measure, the bill came before the full Senate. 2 During
debate, Senate Minority Leader Mark Snyder (cosponsor) inserted a "right-to-work"
amendment into the bill.' 3 The "right-to-work" amendment thrust what had been a
relatively obscure bill dealing with restrictive covenants into the center of a political
firestorm that had raged in Oklahoma for decades." The amended bill failed on a
vote of fifteen for and thirty-three against.'"
The current amendments met with comparatively greater success. By May 24,
2001, both the Senate and House had passed the amendments with only two votes
against enactment, and the legislature passed the amendments without change in their
substantive language from the time of introduction to the time of their passage in
both houses." The Governor signed the bill into law on June 4, 2001, and the
amendments went into effect statewide that same day."
The amendments attempt to bring clarity to noncompetitive employment
covenants,'" and this note will argue that the amendments do just that. By bringing
Oklahoma statutes into accord with the development of case law, Oklahoma
practitioners, and especially those unfamiliar with the intricacies of Oklahoma law,
will be more certain as to the types of covenants that Oklahoma courts will enforce.
This note, however, also will argue that the amendments are inadequate in one major
respect: the changes exclude several types of restrictive covenants that are desirable
to Oklahoma employers and employees. In addressing these concerns, this note also
will provide suggestions for the legislature to continue the process of improving
Oklahoma's law on restrictive employment covenants.
In an effort to address these issues, this note will first review the common law
treatment of covenants in restraint of trade. Next, Part III will discuss Oklahoma's
law on noncompetitive covenants prior to the 2001 amendments. Part IV will focus
Numbers: SB662, at http://www.lsb.state.ok.us/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
12. Vaughn Interview, supra note 8.
13. Chuck Ervin, Senate Resurrects Bill, Then Defeats Measure, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June 21,
2000, at AI 1-12.
14. Id. This issue came to an uneasy resolution on September 25, 2001, when Oklahoma voters
approved an amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution enacting right-to-work. See Questions, Answers
Explaining Right-to-Work Provisions, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 3, 2001, at AS; see also OKLA. CONST.
art. XXIII, § IA (text of the right-to-work amendment); Tom .indley, Right-to-Work Defended- Group
Offers Legal Assistance as State Fights Federal Lawsuit, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 20, 2001, at A I
(noting that labor groups have filed federal lawsuits contesting the validity of the right-to-work
amendment).
15. In the aftermath of this vote, the work of the Senate came to a screeching halt over the right-to-
work issue, with Democrats walking out en masse to protest the calling of Lieutenant Governor Mary
Fallin to preside over the contentious issue. Ervin, supra note 13.
16. Oklahoma Legislature Homepage, Status of Measures, History, 2001 Regular Session, Measure
Numbers: SB662, at http://www.lsb.state.ok.us/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
17. Id.
18. Vaughn Interview, supra note 8.
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on the areas of law reconciled by the amendments, and Part V will provide guidance
to courts and practitioners in navigating the statutory standards of section 219A.
Finally, Part VI will highlight several types of covenants that the amendments seem
to exclude completely.
il. Common Law History of Employment Covenants Not to Compete
From common law England to modern America, restrictive covenants have
reflected the tension among several competing policy concerns. 9 These concerns
include personal economic freedom, freedom of contract, and general business
ethics.' Employers raise these policies as concerns regarding the protection of trade
secrets from unethical competitors, the preservation of established client relationships,
and the protection of time and money invested in training new employees." In
opposition to these concerns stand issues of economic mobility, personal freedom, the
diminution of future bargaining power, and the stagnation of ideas, processes, and
methods."
Consistent with its English law roots, American contract law generally requires that
courts enforce contracts without reference to the fairness of the terms.' While
American law has given a substantial presumption of validity to most types of
contracts, this has not been the case with restrictive employment agreements. In
fact, most courts and legislatures have looked with disfavor on these types of
agreements and have only allowed them, if at all, under limited circumstances.
A. English Common Law
Early English courts found all restrictive employment covenants to be void and
unenforceable. ' This total ban on noncompete agreements resulted, in large part,
because of the guild system. 7 During the Middle Ages, an individual's ability to
19. Blake, supra note 1, at 626; see also Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685
(Ohio Ct. Corn. P1. 1952) (outlining the development of restrictive covenants in England and America);
I E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.3 (2d ed. 1998). The tension between the
concerns of employers and those of employees is evidenced in modem America by the existence of
websites such as http://www.breakyoumoncompete.com/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
20. Blake, supra note 1, at 627.
21. Id.
22. Id.; see also Mel Bracht, KOCO-5 Settles with Former Reporter, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 3,
2000, at A 14; Kris Maher, The Jungle: Focus on Recruitment, Pay and Getting Ahead, WALL ST. J., Oct.
23, 2001, at B 14. In addition to the noted social policy concerns, an intense economic debate rages over
the utility of restrictive employment covenants to promote economic growth. For a detailed discussion
on this point see Christine M. O'Malley, Covenants Not to Compete in the Massachusetts Hi-Tech
Industry: Assessing the Need for a Legislative Solution, 79 B.U. L. REv. 1215 (1999); Jason S. Wood,
A Comparison of the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete and Recent Economic Histories of
Four High Technology Regions, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 14 (2000).
23. I FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, §§ 2.2, 2.7.
24. Blake. supra note 1, at 629.
. 25. Id.
26. Id.




succeed economically was directly related to his ability to learn a skill as an
apprentice.' Accordingly, the guild system was the dominant labor force in
England, and every employment covenant decision of this era was rendered in the
context of this system." The guild system had elaborate rules and regulations,
imposed both from within the guilds and from political bodies such as Parliament and
local authorities." In addition, the guilds were not merely an economic/labor
system, but also were a cultural force that both reflected and controlled the mores of
Medieval England? Because of the complex economic and cultural identity of the
early guild system, English courts based many of the decisions striking down
restrictive employment covenants on a violation of laws or traditions that were unique
to this system.32 Additionally, the dominant goal of early English courts was the
attainment of fair conditions of commerce and industry,33 which further motivated
courts to strike down employment noncompete agreements in favor of economic
independence.'
Even with the decline of the guild system and the change of focus from fair
conditions to the achievement of national prominence that occurred in the sixteenth
century, English courts continued to invalidate restrictive employment covenants."
In all likelihood, a desire to encourage free trade and individual initiative motivated
this continued practice.'
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, freedom of contract
emerged as a dominant policy concern, and, in reaction, English courts began to
allow limited restraints on trade." Mitchel v. Reynolds is most often cited as the
watershed case of this era, ushering in a truly modem approach to restrictive
covenants." In Mitchel, the defendant assigned a five-year lease of a bakery to the
plaintiff.' The defendant also agreed that he would not work as a baker in the same
28. Michael L. Agee, Comment, Covenants Not to Compete in Tennessee Employment Contracts:
Almost Everything You Wanted to Know but Were Afraid to Ask, 55 TENN. L. REV. 341, 347 (1988).
29. Blake, supra note I, at 632. Professor Blake further argues that the customary rules of
apprenticeship played a decisive role in the reasoning of these early decisions striking down all restrictive
employment covenants. Id. For example, a typical apprenticeship lasted seven years, and many of the
early cases struck down efforts by enterprising masters to extend this period through the use of restrictive
covenants. Id. at 632-33.
30. Id. at 633.
31. Id. at 634.
32. Id. at 632.
33. 8 WILLIAM S. HoLDswORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGUSH LAW 56-57 (2d ed. 1937).
34. These motivations led one Medieval judge, in striking down a restrictive employment covenant,
to exclaim, "By God, if the plaintiff were here he should go to prison until he paid a fine to the King."
Blake, supra note 1, at 636 n.33 (quoting Dyer's Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, 5, Mich. 26 (C.P. 1414)).
35. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 61.
36. Id. at 57.
37. Agee, supra note 28, at 34849.
38. 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
39. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 60-61. Indeed, Professor Blake notes that early "cases which
failed to cite [Mitchel v. Reynolds] are difficult to find." Blake, supra note 1, at 639.
40. Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 347.
2002]
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parish for the duration of the lease.4 In upholding the covenant not to compete,
Chief Justice Parker reasoned that "particular restraints, if imposed upon a good and
adequate consideration so as to make it a proper and useful contract" were valid.42
The Mitchel court further reasoned that courts should judge such restrictions by
looking to whether the restraint "prevented [the party] from earning his livelihood...
or deprived the public by depriving it of the abilities of one of its members."4 '
While Mitchel addressed a covenant not to compete formed ancillary to the sale of
a business, the line of cases following Mitchel firmly established the modern "rule
of reason" test in England for evaluating restrictive employment covenants as well."
B. American Development
American courts of the nineteenth century followed the later English rule, allowing
reasonable restraints of trade if limited by duration and geographic scope.4' While
many early American courts refused to enforce covenants that extended to an entire
state without regard to their reasonableness," this approach changed with Oregon
Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor.4' In Winsor, the United States Supreme Court
upheld a covenant that a former steamship owner would not compete with its
purchaser in the state of California. The Winsor Court reasoned that the covenant
was reasonable, even though its geographic scope encompassed an entire state,
because "in this country ... state lines interpose such a slight barrier to social and
business intercourse."" Shortly after Winsor, New York, Massachusetts, and Rhode
Island also announced a rule of reason without regard to state boundaries.4 Thus,
by the end of the nineteenth century, U.S., as well as English, courts had adopted the
rule of reason as the dominant test to judge covenants not to compete. This rule
continues as the dominant method of assessing the validity of most types of
restrictive covenants50
41. Id.
42. Id. at 348.
43. Id. at 350.
44. See Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., 1894 App. Cas. 535, affirming
1893 I Ch. 630 (C.A. 1892); Mitchel v. Reynolds, I P. Wrns. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711);
Homer v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831).
45. See Pike v. Thomas, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 486, 488 (1817); Pierce v. Woodward, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.)
206, 208 (1828) (sale of grocery store with verbal agreement not to compete within certain distance);
Palmer v. Stebbins, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 188, 193 (1825) (exclusive agreement to carry all goods of obligor
and not encourage competition with boatman to carry goods); Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223, 225 & note
[a] (1811) (purchase of stage line between Boston and Providence, Rhode Island); Nobles v. Bates, 7
Cow. 307, 309 (N.Y. 1827).
46. See Taylor v. Blachard, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 370,375 (1866); Lawrence v. Kidder, 10 Barb. 641,
655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1851).
47. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64 (1874).
48. Id. at 67.
49. Blake, supra note 1, at 644.
50. Id. at 645. Another interesting twist in the law of restrictive covenants in the U.S. came with
the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). From the earliest
interpretation of the Sherman Act, it was clear that U.S. courts must evaluate certain contracts,




IlI. Pre-Amendment Oklahoma Law on Employment Covenants Not to Compete
A. Evolution of Case Law from a Strict Evaluation to a Rule of Reason Approach
Prior to the 2001 amendments, Oklahoma had a long and most uncertain
relationship with restrictive employment covenants. In 1890, Oklahoma adopted the
Dakota Territory's law on covenants in restraint of trade." The Revised Laws of
1910 compiled this statute, along with others, and codified it as title 12, sections 978-
980.52 These statutes remained unchanged for decades, with the legislature adopting
minor amendments in 1989."3
While the statute itself may have remained relatively unchanged for more than 100
years, its interpretation by Oklahoma courts has not.' In 1948, E.S. Miller
of Appeals announced this holding in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.
1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
In Addyston, the government charged six cast-iron manufacturers with dividing territory and fixing
prices. Id. at 273. The manufacturers argued that their activities were not illegal under section I of the
Sherman Act because Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to invalidate the common law rule of
reason. id. at 278.
The court, while partially relying on a naked/ancillary distinction, held that the activities of the
manufacturers violated the Sherman Act because they were an unreasonable restraint of trade. Id. at 291.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the use of the rule of reason to evaluate some
contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade. Addyston, 175 U.S. at 247.
Many commentators have urged that courts should apply a stricter standard to restrictive employment
covenants in light of the federal antitrust laws; however, these suggestions have gone largely unheeded.
See Charles A. Sullivan, Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild": Antitrust Treatment of Postemployment
Restraints of Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L. REV. 621,647-50 (as noted in Agee, supra note 28, at 351); see also
Blake, supra note I, at 628. While the law that governs antitrust cases is different than the law applied
to employment covenants not to compete, the use of the rule of reason by the United States Supreme
Court in the former context has greatly influenced courts in using that same test to evaluate the latter.
Agee, supra note 28, at 351-52.
51. The 1890 version reads:
Section 7. Every Contract by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful
profession, trade or business of any kind, otherwise than as provided by the next two
sections, is to that extent void.
Section 8. One who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to
refrain from carrying on a similar business within a specified county, city or part thereof,
so long as the buyer, or any person deriving title to the goodwill from him carries on a
like business therein.
Section 9. Partners may, upon or in anticipation of a dissolution of the partnership,
agree that none of them will carry on a similar business within the same city or town
where the partnership business has been transacted, or within a specified part thereof.
OKLA. STAT. ch. 17, art. 4, §§ 7-9 (1890).
For the text of the Law of the Dakota Territory see COMPILED LAW OF THE DAKOTA TERRITORY
(Bismarck, Dakota 1887).
52. 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 978-980 (1910). The 1910 version is substantively identical to the 1890
version cited supra note 51.
53. The 1989 amendment substituted the phrase "Sections 218 and 219 of this title" for the phrase
"the next two sections" in section 217. 15 OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 217-219 (West 2000).
54. On the evolution of interpretation see generally Robert C. Smith, Jr., Survey of the Law: V. The
Meaning of Restraint From Exercising a Lawful Profession, Trade, Business & Restraint of Trade Under
the Oklahoma Statutes, 4 OKLA. CiTY U. L. REV. 208 (1979).
20021
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Laboratories v. Griffin" provided the Oklahoma Supreme Court its first opportunity
to interpret title 15, section 217. In Miller, the court examined a covenant that
prohibited a pharmaceutical salesman from competing with his former employer for
two years after the employment terminated.' The court held that the covenant was
void." The Miller court reasoned that while the common law rule allowed
reasonable restraints of trade, this rule of reason did not survive the enactment of
section 217." The court further reasoned that because of this literal reading, any
covenant must be specifically exempted by the statute itself to be valid.'
More than twenty years later, the Oklahoma Supreme Court began to relax this
strict reading of section 217 in Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co.'
In Tatum, the court reviewed a covenant that restrained an insurance salesman from
selling group accident or health coverage to known clients of his former employer
for two years following termination." The Tatum court held that the covenant was
valid and enforceable.' The court reasoned that the Tatum covenant was distin-
guishable from the Miller covenant in that the former only partially restrained the
agent's ability to sell insurance.' The Tatum court further reasoned that the
covenant did not violate section 217 because it did not attempt to protect the former
employer against fair competition, but only against the unfair competition that would
result from the former employee using information and relationships gained during
his employment.'
In 1977, Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA' provided the
next step in the evolution of the interpretation of section 217. In NCAA, the court
evaluated an NCAA rule that prohibited participating schools from hiring more than
a specified number of assistant coaches.' While attacking the rule primarily on
antitrust grounds, many of the coaches argued that the prohibition on hiring assistant
coaches violated section 217.67 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the
provision did not violate Oklahoma's prohibition on covenants in restraint of trade
because "statutes invalidating contracts in restraint of trade must be determined by
its [sic] reasonableness."" The NCAA court further held that contracts in reasonable
restraint of trade do not violate section 217.'
55. 1948 OK 149, 194 P.2d 877.
56. Id. 1 I, 194 P.2d at 878.
57. Id. 1 I1, 194 P.2d at 878.
58. Id. 5-11, 194 P.2d at 878-79.
59. Id. I1, 194 P.2d at 878.
60. 1970 OK 27, 465 P.2d 448.
61. Id. 11,465 P.2d at 449.
62. Id. 1 12, 465 P.2d at 451.
63. Id. 17, 465 P.2d at 451.
64. Id. 18, 465 P.2d at 451.
65. 1977 OK 17, 561 P.2d 499.
66. Id. I1, 561 P.2d at 501.
67. Id. 1 19, 561 P.2d at 508.





Four years later, in Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston,7 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
provided the final blow to the strict reading of section 217 employed in Miller. As
in NCAA, Crown Paint presented an agreement that the defendant Bankston primarily
contested on antitrust grounds; however, the defendant raised section 217 as an
alternate argument to invalidate the covenant.' The Crown Paint court clearly
affirmed the ruling of NCAA, holding again that section 217 only invalidates
unreasonable restraints of trade.' As the court would later note, the combined
holdings of NCAA and Crown Paint squarely returned Oklahoma law on restrictive
employment covenants to the majority" rule of reason approach."'
B. What Are "Reasonable" Employment Restraints Under a Rule of Reason
Analysis?
After establishing that section 217 only invalidates unreasonable restraints of trade,
it next becomes necessary to determine the elements of a "reasonable" restraint of
trade. Loewen Group Acquisition Corp. v. Matthews clearly outlines these
elements." In Loewen, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals analyzed a covenant
that restricted the former employee of a funeral home from operating funeral homes
within a fifteen-mile radius of any funeral home operated by the former employer.'
In finding the restraint unreasonable, the court considered three factors: (I) whether
the restraint was no greater than is required for the employer's protection; (2) whether
the restraint imposed undue hardship on the employee; and (3) whether the restraint
injured the public."
When considering these factors, the court looked to the geographic scope of the
restraint, the duration of the restraint, and to whether the covenant restrained all
competition or only the "unfair" competition of an employee who had gained
valuable information and relationships during employment.7 The Loewen court went
on to hold that "any agreement that seeks to prohibit fair competition can never be
reasonable."" Finally, the court again pointed to the non-solicitation agreement
upheld in Tatum as an example of a valid restriction because it only restrained the
former employee from soliciting business from the clients of the former employer.'
70. 1981 OK 104, 640 P.2d 948.
71. d. I1 21-24, 640 P.2d at 951-52.
72. Id. 1 23, 640 P.2d at 952.
73. For cases from other jurisdictions employing the rule of reason approach see Millard v. Elec.
Cable Specialists, 790 F. Supp. 857, 860 (D. Minn. 1992); Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 127 N.E.2d
235, 239 (Ind. 1955); Frederick v. Profl Bldg. Maint. Indus., 344 N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976);
Marine Contractors Co. v. Hurley, 310 N.E.2d 915, 920 (Mass. 1974); Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502
N.W.2d 796, 799 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Cent. Adjustment Bureau v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Tenn.
1984); Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983).
74. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, 1989 OK 122, 1 12, 780 P.2d 1168, 1171.
75. 2000 OK CIV APP 109, 12 P.3d 977.
76. Id. '1 3, 12 P.3d at 979.
77. Id. 1 15, 12 P.3d at 980.
78. Id. (H 18-20, 12 P.3d at 981-82.
79. Id. 121, 12 P.3d at 982.
80. Id.
2002]
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C. Reformation by the Court of Unreasonable Covenants
The final major development in the area of restrictive employment covenants is the
reformation of unreasonable covenants by the court. Reformation differs from what
is commonly known as the "blue-pencil" doctrine. The "blue-pencil" doctrine derives
its name from the tradition of "striking, or penciling out, void, offensive or
unreasonable language in a contract without rendering the entire agreement
unenforceable."'" In contrast to the "striking out" of the blue-pencil doctrine,
Oklahoma courts engage in all-out judicial modification of offensive or overbroad
provisions."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the issue of judicial reformation in Bayly,
Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard.3 In Bayly, the court struck down an agreement that
precluded an employee from soliciting the customers of his former employer for three
years after termination.u In doing so, the court recognized that judicial modification
of an unreasonable covenant is justified if the court can cure the defects by the
"imposition of reasonable limitations on the activities embraced, time, or geographic
limitations."" The Bayly court noted, however, that a court cannot reform a
covenant so offensive that it would require the court to supply material terms' of
a contract.'7
Loewen addressed another aspect of judicial reformation. In Loewen, the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reviewed a covenant that prohibited a former
employee from operating, owning, or working at a funeral home within a fifteen-mile
radius of any home owned by the former employer." The court held that the
covenant was unreasonable and therefore void.9 In refusing to reform the
agreement, the court stated that it would not modify the covenant because the
employer had designed the covenant to prevent fair competition, not to protect
sensitive client information or established relationships." This holding firmly
81. John W. Bowers et al., Covenants Not to Compete: Their Use and Enofbrcement in Indiana, 31
VAL. U. L. REV. 65, 79 (1996).
82. Many commentators argue that judicial modification gives greater effect to the intent of the
parties than merely striking the offensive provision and enforcing what remains. See, e.g., 6A ARTHUR
LINTON CORaBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1390 (1962), reprinted in 15 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1390 (interim ed. 1993).
83. 1989 OK 122, 780 P.2d 1168. On judicial modification see also Loewen, 24, 12 P.3d at 982
(refusing to modify a covenant because it would require material alteration of essential elements); Key
Temp. Pers., Inc. v. Cox, 1994 OK CIV APP 123, 17, 884 P.2d 1213, 1217 (upholding a trial court's
modification of a restrictive covenant); Cohen Realty, Inc. v. Marinick, 1991 OK CIV APP 71, 1 7, 817
P.2d 747, 749 (finding that a covenant was "incurable").
84. Bayly, 'I 3. 780 P.2d at 1169.
85. Id. 14, 780 P.2d at 1173.
86. See Medline Indus., Inc. v. Grubb, 670 F. Supp. 831, 837 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Lee/O'Keefe Ins.
Agency, Inc. v. Ferega, 516 N.E.2d 1313, 1319 (11. App. Ct. 1987).
87. Bayly, 1 19, 780 P.2d at 1175.
88. Loewen Group Acquisition Corp. v. Matthews, 2000 OK CIV APP 109,1 3, 12 P.3d 977, 979.
89. Id. 1 24, 12 P.3d at 982.,




establishes that an Oklahoma court will not modify a covenant that is "fundamentally
flawed," i.e., a covenant designed to protect against "fair" competition.'
IV. The Amendments Reconcile Statutes and Case Law
As explained in Part I, the major addition of the 2001 amendments is section
219A, which specifically enables employers and employees to enter into non-
solicitation agreements. However, section 219A also invalidates any other type of
restrictive covenant between employers and employees.
While these amendments initially may seem radical, a close inspection of
Oklahoma case law reveals that the amendments simply bring Oklahoma statutes in
line with established case law."2 While Oklahoma courts historically have been
extremely hostile to most types of employer-employee restrictive covenants, 3
Oklahoma courts have not expressed this same hostility toward non-solicitation
agreements. Prior to the 2001 amendments, with the exception of Board of Regents
of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA,9 every reported case in which the
91. Id. 1 24, 12 P.3d at 982.
92. At first glance, it may seem that Oklahoma case law does not provide a complete picture of
Oklahoma law on covenants not to compete because the reported cases only address "employee," rather
than "executive," noncompete agreements. It may seem attractive to argue that, under pre-amendment
Oklahoma law, surely Oklahoma courts would have enforced a noncompete agreement negotiated as part
of a CEO's multimillion dollar employment contract. This argument, however, is flawed for at least three
reasons. First, pre-amendment Oklahoma statutory and case law do not consider "fairness in bargaining
power" or "executive status" as relevant factors in judging the validity of noncompete agreements. See
COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-2-I 13(2)(d) (1994) (specifically noting that, under Colorado law, "[executive and
management personnel and officers and employees who constitute professional staff to executive and
management personnel" are exempt from Colorado's ban on covenants not to compete - Oklahoma law
has no such provision). Second, and closely related, because the Oklahoma Supreme Court never
articulated any such employee/executive distinction in its case law, if accepted, such arguments would
provide absolutely no guidance to attorneys attempting to navigate Oklahoma's already unclear law on
covenants not to compete. This, in turn, highlights the final problem with any employee/executive
distinction: where would Oklahoma courts draw the line between valid executive covenants and
impermissible employee covenants? Seemingly, every employee, except those at the apex of
organizational structures, are "managed" by someone, and the sliding scale of bargaining power along
that hierarchy of management cannot provide meaningful direction to Oklahoma courts or practitioners.
So, while the policy arguments in favor of noncompetitive covenants may prove persuasive, policy
makers should resist the temptation to argue that any such exception existed, or should have existed,
under pre-amendment case law. Such whittling away at the law on covenants not to compete would
further muddy an already unclear area of the law. But see E-mail from Gary Derrick, Chair, Oklahoma
General Corporation Act Committee, to Jeb Boatman (Oct. 1, 2002, 10:56:48 CST) (on file with author)
("Case law alone describes only slices of life, which we then extrapolate to reach an understanding of
"the law." Regarding the [Oklahoma] restrictive covenants cases; this relatively large number of cases
covers a surprisingly narrow factual range .... We do not have cases dealing with executive officers,
start-up promoters, essential consultants, recipients of venture capital, licensees, or others with respect
to whom restrictive covenants would be more reasonable.").
93. See supra Part IlI.A; see also Neal v. Penn. Life Ins. Co., 1970 OK 13, 480 P.2d 923; Cohen
Realty, Inc. v. Marinick, 1991 OK CIV APP 71, 817 P.2d 747.
94. It is important to recognize that NCAA is essentially an antitrust case. While the court does in
fact uphold a restrictive agreement that is not a non-solicitation agreement, it does so summarily and
without any meaningful analysis.
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Oklahoma courts have upheld a restrictive covenant as reasonable has involved a
non-solicitation agreement. 5 Oklahoma courts consistently return to the limited
nature of non-solicitation agreements and the protection they provide from unfair
competition as themes in upholding the use of these types of restrictive agreements.
For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld a non-solicitation agreement
for the first time in Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co. The non-
solicitation agreement in Tatum specifically prohibited a terminated employee from
[slelling, or attempting to sell, any form of accident or health insurance
to or on any of the [former employer's] insureds under group policies or
franchise policyholders, and from inducing, or attempting to induce, any
of the [former employer's] insureds under group policies or franchise
policyholders to cancel, lapse, or fail to renew their policies with [the
former employer]."
In finding the covenant valid, the Oklahoma Supreme Court denominated the
covenant a mere "hands-off' policy, a term that is echoed in several subsequent
opinions."' The court reasoned that, as a "hands-off' policy with respect to the
former employer's customers, the restriction did not preclude the former employee
from exercising his profession by selling insurance to noncustomers and therefore did
not violate section 217.9" The court further reasoned that the parties had not
designed the non-solicitation agreement to protect the former employer against
legitimate forms of competition, but rather to protect the former employer against the
unfair use of information and relationships acquired during employment."
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals undertook a similar analysis in Key
Temporary Personnel, Inc. v. Cox.' In Key, the court upheld a non-solicitation
agreement that prevented a former employee from soliciting the clients of the
95. See Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston, 1981 OK 104, 1 1, 640 P.2d 948, 949; Tatum v. Colonial
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 1970 OK 27, 1 7, 465 P.2d 448, 451; Thayne A. Hedges Reg'I Speech &
Hearing Ctr., Inc. v. Baughman, 1998 OK CIV APP 122, in I, 3, 996 P.2d 939, 940-41; Key Temp.
Pers., Inc. v. Cox. 1994 OK CIV APP 123,1 9, 884 P.2d 1213, 1215-16; see also Bayly, Martin & Fay,
Inc. v. Pickard, 1989 OK 122, 11 15-17, 780 P.2d 1168, 1173-74 (striking down a non-solicitation
agreement that included overly broad restrictions on the acceptance of work from businesses not clients
at the time of termination and a restriction on several types of business activities).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently bolstered this conclusion in Cardiovascular Surgical
Specialists, Corp. v. Mammana, 2002 OK 27,1 14, 2002 WL 530188, at *3 (Okla. Apr. 9, 2002) (noting
that pre-amendment Oklahoma law only upheld non-solicitation agreements, not general covenants not
to compete).
96. Tatum, 1 7, 465 P.2d at 450.
97. Id. 17, 465 P.2d at 451; see also Baughman, 1 3, 996 P.2d at 941; Key, 9, 884 P.2d at 1216.
98. Tatum, 1 7-8, 12, 465 P.2d at 451-52.
99. Id. 1 8, 465 P.2d at 451. Importantly, courts can also analyze the use of customer information
and client lists under a "trade secrets" rubric. The law of trade secrets is beyond the scope of this note;
however, on this topic see 78 OKLA. STAT. §§ 51-55 (2001). See also Central Plastics Co. v. Goodson,
1975 OK 71, 537 P.2d 330. For a detailed discussion see ROGER M. MILGRAM, MILGRAM ON TRADE
SECRETS § 1.09 (2001).




employer for a period of nine months following termination.'" ' The Key court
recognized that the covenant in question, like the covenant in Tatum, was merely a
"hands-off" provision with respect to a limited number of former clients and that the
non-solicitation agreement only protected against an unfair competitive advantage.'
A final illustrative case is Thayne A. Hedges Regional Speech and Hearing Center,
Inc. v. Baughman."3 In Baughman, the non-solicitation agreement required that an
employee not contract with any "group, agency, client and/or agency contracting with
or served by" the former employer for a period of two years following ter-
mination."° The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that the non-solicitation
agreement was valid, in large part, because it only required a "hands-off' policy with
respect to former clients."'° The Baughman court reasoned that the protection of
existing contracts and clients is a legitimate business concern."
V. Suggestions for Navigating the New Amendments
The amendments to title 15, sections 217-219A, raise several interesting and
important drafting issues and areas of potential litigation. Thus, courts and
practitioners should be aware of potential pitfalls in navigating the new
amendments."o
A. Courts and Practitioners Should Limit the Definition of "Established Cus-
tomers"
The recent amendments provide an "established customers" standard for deciding
which customers a former employee may not solicit. The statute, however, does not
define this standard."° Conversations with Representative Vaughn, the House
sponsor and chief proponent of the amendments, indicate an intent that courts should
interpret the "established customers" standard very broadly.' 9  Such an
interpretation, however, would create at least two problems. First, it is a settled
canon of statutory construction that courts must attempt to give meaning to each
101. id. 1 4, 17, 884 P.2d at 1214-15, 1217.
102. Id. 19, 884 P.2d at 1215-16.
103. 1998 OK CIV APP 122, 996 P.2d 939.
104. Id. 1 I, 996 P.2d at 940.
105. id. 13, 996 P.2d at 941.
106. Id.
107. For general guidance on drafting covenants not to compete see 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 19,
§ 5.3a.
108. Courts have defined "customer" in another context to mean "one who has had repeated dealings
with another." Lyons v. Otter Tail Power Co., 297 N.W. 691,693 (N.D. 1941). Although this definition
did not deal with restrictive employment covenants, it still supports the idea that practitioners, and
ultimately Oklahoma courts, should provide some type of "frequency of business" limitation on the term
"established customer."
109. Vaughn Interview, supra note 8. In fact, Representative Vaughn suggests that the amendments
preclude solicitation of any client on the business' "customer list," meaning any client that the business
has ever served. Id. During the interview, he used the example of a law firm, saying that a non-
solicitation agreement should prohibit a former employee from contacting a client for whom a lawyer
in the firm drafted a will twenty years earlier. Id.
2002]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
word within a statute."' If Oklahoma courts interpreted the "established customer"
standard to mean any customer that the business has ever dealt with, the "established"
language of "established customer" would be superfluous. Second, such a broad
standard could result in oppressive results by keeping a former employee from
contacting businesses that have no intention of remaining a client of the former
employer and that have not conducted business with the former employer for years.
In any event, the absence of a defined standard for "established customers" invites
litigation, and the Oklahoma legislature should further define this standard.
While it is advisable that the legislature address this omission to provide further
certainty, as it stands, courts and practitioners must look to prior case law for
guidance in interpreting the "established customer" standard."' Key Temporary
Personnel, Inc. v. Cox, discussed previously, involved a standard similar to the
"established client" language of section 219A."' In Key, the non-solicitation
agreement provided that upon termination, for a term of nine months, the former
employee would not
directly or indirectly solicit, divert or attempt to solicit or divert any
client of the Company, provided that client was a client of the Company
at the time of the Employee's termination and provided further the client
remains a client of the Company during the nine month non-solicitation
period.'1
3
In granting a preliminary injunction, the trial judge enjoined the former employee
from soliciting (1) Key clients assigned to the employee during her employment and
(2) Key clients who, although not assigned to the former employee, were known by
the employee to be Key clients."' The order further provided that a business would
only be considered a client if it had purchased services from Key within the previous
six months."' The order also required Key to provide the former employee with a
list of clients assigned to her during her employment and a list of clients that the
former employee knew to be Key clients."6 Finally, the order required Key to
update the list twice a month to reflect clients who had not purchased services during
the previous six months."' On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed the trial court's interpretation of "client" as reasonable and upheld the
injunction."'
110. In re Siegmann, 1988 OK 59, 1 12, 757 P.2d 820, 824.
111. Importantly, no other state's statutory law on covenants not to compete uses the phrase
"established customer." See generally COVENANTS Nar TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Brian
M. Malsberger ed., 2d ed. 1996).
112. 1994 OK CIV APP 123, 884 P.2d 1213.
113. Id. 14, 884 P.2d at 1214-15.
114. Id. 15, 884 P.2d at 1215.
115. Id.
116. Id. 16, 884 P.2d at 1215.
117. Id.




While the covenant in Key did not specifically use the term "established clients,"
the functional definition affirmed by the court as reasonable provides two principles
for navigating section 219A. First, the court defined "clients" to include both clients
assigned to the former employee and those merely known to be clients by the former
employee."' Following this guidance, it seems reasonable that practitioners need
not limit non-solicitation agreements to only restrict contact with clients assigned to
the employee during employment, but may draft covenants to include all known
clients of the former employer.'"'
Second, the Key court limited "clients" to those businesses that had purchased
services within the past six months.'2' It seems reasonable, following this guidance,
that practitioners should employ a similar limitation in drafting and litigating the
"established" standard of section 219A. At the very least, courts and practitioners
should limit the restricted clients to those clients who frequently conduct business
with the former employer. By limiting the restricted clients, courts will protect
employees from overbroad non-solicitation agreements that restrict access to all
clients who have ever conducted business with the former employer regardless of the
current status of the business relationship. In addition, a "frequency of business"
limitation will provide some assurance to an employer that a court may not invalidate
its covenant as outside of the "established client" language of section 219A.
Finally, in drafting covenants that attempt to meet the "established client" standard
of section 219A, practitioners should include a severability or judicial modification
clause. Under pre-amendment law, the Oklahoma Supreme Court clearly affirmed
the ability of a court to judicially modify an offensive covenant," and there is little
reason to believe that a court faced with a good-faith attempt to meet the "established
client" standard of 219A would -not do so today. It seems especially likely that a
court would modify an overbroad non-solicitation agreement when the parties
themselves have included a provision expressly calling for such modification. An
appropriate provision could read: "The parties agree that each sentence, term, or
provision of the agreement shall be considered severable and/or open to judicial
modification and that should one portion of the agreement be deemed not in accord
with Oklahoma law, the other provisions of the agreement will not be affected."'"
B. Limitations as to Time and Geographic Scope Under Section 219A
The language of section 219A does not address whether non-solicitation
agreements under the new amendments must accord with the pre-amendment
reasonableness standards as to duration and geographic scope. However, because
courts will likely at least continue to employ a reasonable duration standard,
practitioners must look to prior case law for guidance.
119. Id. 15, 884 P.2d at 1215.
120. Employers could receive maximum protection by providing new employees with a list of all
clients considered "established" at the time of hiring, thus ensuring that every client of the former
employer would fall into the limitation employed in Key.
121. Id.
122. See supra note 83-85 and accompanying text.
123. See Bowers et al., supra note 81, at 88.
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While unique circumstances may persuade them to do so in the future, to date,
Oklahoma courts have refused to extend the reasonable duration standard beyond two
years." In fact, in striking down the covenant in Loewen, the Oklahoma Court of
Civil Appeals specifically refused to enforce a three-year covenant not to com-
pete."2 The Loewen court reasoned that because "the time period .. .[was] one
year longer than that approved" in previous cases, it was too restrictive."2 Because
of this reluctance to approve covenants that last for longer than two years, a prudent
practitioner should not extend the duration of a non-solicitation agreement beyond
two years, unless extremely unique circumstances warrant such an extension.12 7
Oklahoma courts have been less clear regarding the permissible geographic scope
of restrictive employment covenants. However, the propriety of any geographic
standard seems questionable at best when dealing with non-solicitation agreements.
The policies behind the use of non-solicitation agreements - the protection of insider
information and established business relationships" - are not necessarily bounded
by geographic borders. The need to protect these interests should reasonably extend
to any area of the country where an "established client" is located. Nonetheless,
under pre-amendment law, Oklahoma courts followed the rule that each restriction
must be "no greater than is required for the employer's protection from unfair com-
petition," '29 and, in light of Oklahoma's historic antipathy toward employment
covenants not to compete,13" courts could continue to require some type of
geographic limitation on non-solicitation agreements, even though there seem to be
few, if any, policy justifications for such a restriction.
A comparison of the holdings of two recent pre-amendment decisions will expose
the inconsistency imposed by the pre-amendment geographic standard. In the Loewen
decision, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals invalidated a restrictive covenant that
prohibited a nursing home employee from operating a nursing home within a fifteen-
mile radius of any existing nursing home owned by the employer.' The court
reasoned that this restriction would preclude operation of any nursing home within
nearly the entire Oklahoma City metro area, and was therefore unreasonable.
3 2
However, in Baughnan, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals upheld a restriction
124. See Tatum v. Colonial Life &.Accident Ins. Co., 1970 OK 27, 465 P.2d 448 (upholding
restrictions of two years as reasonable); Thayne A. Hedges Reg'I Speech and Hearing Ctr., Inc. v.
Baughman, 1998 OK CIV APP 122, 996 P.2d 939 (same).
125. Loewen Group Acquisition Corp. v. Matthews, 2000 OK CIV APP 109, 1 24, 12 P.3d 977,
982.
126. Id. 1 18, 12 P.3d at 981.
127. Because of the reluctance of Oklahoma courts to uphold covenants that endure beyond two
years, contracting parties should include in a noncompete clause any unique considerations or
circumstances that require a restriction longer than two years. See I FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, § 3.6
(noting that courts interpret contracts in accord with the parties' objective intent as evidenced by, among
other things, the language of the contract itself).
128. Key Temp. Pers., Inc. v. Cox, 1994 OK CIV APP 123,91 10, 884 P.2d 1213, 1216.
129. Loewen, 91 15, 12 P.3d at 980.
130. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.





that precluded a former employee from soliciting any customers of the former
employer, seemingly without reference to geographic scope.' In affirming the
restriction, the court reasoned that it did not extend beyond the geographic area in
which the employer operated and therefore was not overbroad.'" This reasoning
could arguably be used to extend a restriction to an area much larger than that struck
down in Loewen if, for example, an employer operated on a statewide or even
national scale.
Considering these seemingly contradictory holdings, however, the latter reasoning
is more appropriate for non-solicitation agreements. Employers use non-solicitation
agreements to protect against the unfair competitive advantage that employees gain
by exposure to information and relationships during their employment,' and it is
reasonable that this need for protection could extend to the entire state, or even entire
nation, depending on the scope of the employer's business." Because the interests
protected by non-solicitation agreements are not necessarily bounded by geographic
boundaries, Oklahoma courts should no longer require a geographic limitation on
permissible non-solicitation agreements under section 219A.'"
133. 1998 OK CIV APP 122, 1 1, 996 P.2d 939, 940.
134. id. 13, 996 P.2d at 941.
135. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
136. The issue of nationwide enforcement raises interesting and complex conflict of laws issues.
For example, in Fort Smith Paper Co., Inc. v. Sadler Paper Co., 482 F. Supp. 355, 356-57 (E.D. Okla.
1979), the plaintiff argued that the court should apply Arkansas law, which allowed restrictive
employment covenants, to the challenge of a covenant by an Oklahoma citizen in a federal court sitting
in diversity. The court reasoned that, even if the covenant were valid under Arkansas law, it would be
unenforceable in Oklahoma because of Oklahoma's strong public policy against such restrictions. Id. at
357. The court stated that Oklahoma law had long held that "contracts which are contrary to the public
policy of Oklahoma will not be enforced by Oklahoma courts regardless of their validity in the state
where made." Id. This holding seems especially pertinent to businesses that operate on a national scope,
and practitioners, when drafting or litigating this issue, should ascertain the validity of restrictive
covenants in every jurisdiction in which a business operates. See also Herchman v. Sun Med., Inc., 751
F. Supp. 942, 945 n.2 (N.D. Okla. 1990) (stating that, even if choice of law rules led a court to follow
Texas' law on covenants not.to compete, nonetheless, an Oklahoma court, or a federal court sitting in
diversity, is not "obligated to enforce a foreign contract which is repugnant to the public policy" of
Oklahoma).
137. See Research & Trading Corp. v. Pfuhl, CIV No. 12527, 1992 WL 345465, at *12 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 18, 1992) ("If... the employer's customer base.., extends throughout the nation, or indeed even
internationally .... then it is appropriate that an employee subject to a non-competition agreement be
prohibited from soliciting those customers on behalf of a competitor regardless of their geographic
location."); Ellis v. James V. Hurson Assoc., Inc., 565 A.2d 615, 620 (D.C. 1989) ("[T]he territorial
limitation requirement is generally inapposite where the preliminary injunction entered by the trial court
enjoins [an employee], not generally from competing in the same field as [the former employer], but
merely from soliciting [the former employer's] customers."); Sentry Ins. v. Dunn, 411 So. 2d 336, 337
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that an employer need not limit the geographic scope of a non-
solicitation agreement); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Mouyal, 422 S.E.2d 529, 533 (Ga. 1992) ("Requiring an
express geographic territorial description in all cases is not in keeping with the reality of the modem
business world in which an employee's 'territory' knows no geographic bounds, as the technology of
today permits an employee to service clients located throughout the country and the world."). Oklahoma
practitioners, however, should continue to employ a severability or judicial modification clause in all non-
solicitation agreements until Oklahoma courts definitively settle this issue. See supra note 83-85 and
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C. Courts Should Not Apply the Amendments Retroactively to Invalidate Pre-
Amendment Covenants
There is justified concern among businesses and practitioners as to the effect of
section 219A on covenants formed before June 4, 2001.' Generally, courts have
two options with the enactment of a new or amended statute: (1) the
statute/amendment can be applied retroactively, even to govern legal relationships
formed under a previous statutory scheme; or (2) the statute/amendment will not be
applied retroactively, and legal relationships will be governed by the law in force at
the time of their formation. The latter approach is more appropriate for applying
section 219A for at least two reasons.' 9 First, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in
Franklin v. Sovereign Camp W.O.W," announced a strong presumption against
retroactive application of statutes. In Franklin, the court held that "[tihere is a
presumption ... that statutes are intended to operate prospectively only, and [the
statute] ought not to have a retrospective operation unless [the statute is] so clear,
strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to [it]."' 4 The
Franklin court reviewed a law that governed the permissible activities of fraternal
organizations operating in Oklahoma. 4" In finding that the law did not apply
retroactively to govern a dispute between a fraternal organization and a former
member, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that legislative intent can be found by
looking to the language employed in the statute itself."3 The Franklin court then
highlighted the use of phrases in the statute in question, such as "shall be
transferred," "shall be suspended or expelled," and "shall have the right," to show an'
intent that the statute only apply prospectively." Finally, in noting ambiguous
language in the statute, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reasoned that "[e]very
reasonable doubt is to be construed and resolved against a retroactive operation of
a statute."4 Following the reasoning of Franklin, courts should not apply section
219A retroactively because the language employed, such as "shall be permitted" and
accompanying text.
138. Paula Burkes Erickson, New State Law Poses Questions. Not Solutions, DAILY OKLAHOMAN,
July 22, 2001, at B8 (quoting Oklahoma City attorney Mike Joseph stating that retroactive application
would invalidate numerous covenants established before June 4, 2001, and could raise serious
constitutional questions).
139. While this approach may ensure that courts will evaluate covenants formed prior to June 4,
2001, under a rule of reason standard, this may be little consolation to Oklahoma employers. As
discussed in Part IV, supra, prior to the amendments. Oklahoma courts had only upheld a true covenant
not to compete in one case. Because of this legacy of hostility to true covenants not to compete,
businesses and practitioners should review pre-amendment covenants to ensure that they accord with the
actual practice of Oklahoma courts.
140. 1930 OK 195, 291 P. 513.
141. Id. 1 30, 291 P. at 515; see also Baker v. Tulsa Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 1936 OK 568, 8, 66
P.2d 45, 49 (refusing to apply a statute retroactively because courts generally should construe contracts
in light of the law in effect at the time they were created).
142. Franklin, 19, 291 P. at 514.
143. Id. 23, 291 P. at 515.
144. Id. 1 32-34, 291 P. at 515-16.




"shall be void," shows legislative intent that section 219A apply prospectively
only.'"
Second, section 219A should only apply prospectively because a retroactive
application would raise serious questions regarding section 219A's constitutionality.
It is a fundamental canon of statutory interpretation that between two competing
statutory interpretations, courts prefer an interpretation that avoids possible
constitutional infirmities.'4 While an exhaustive review of Contract Clause'"
jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this note," even a cursory review indicates
that a retroactive application of section 219A would raise serious issues regarding the
unconstitutional impairment of vested contractual obligations. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court provided guidance on the issue of the impairment of contractual
rights in Baker v. Tulsa Building & Loan Ass'n."w In Baker, the court addressed
whether the repeal of a statute could change contractual relationships formed prior
to the repeal."' In refusing to evaluate the contract in light of the repeal, the Baker
court noted that .'[u]nder section 10, art. 1, of the Constitution of the United States,
and section 15, art. 2, of the state Constitution, the Legislature [is] prohibited from
impairing the obligation of a contract made pursuant to existing provisions of law"'
by amendment or repeal." 2
146. Even the language "is to that extent void" found in section 217, which seems to indicate a
present intent to make void, must be "construed and resolved" against retroactivity because, in light of
the overwhelming use of the future tense, the legislature has not employed words that are "so clear,
strong, and imperative" that no other interpretation is reasonable. Id. 1 30, 219 P. at 515.
Cardiovascular Surgical Specialists, Corp. v. Mammana, 2002 OK 27, 2002 WL 530188 (Okla. Apr.
9, 2002), supports this conclusion. Without analyzing the issue of retroactive application, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court applied pre-amendment law to a noncompete agreement in April 2002 - over nine
months after the amendments to section 219A took effect - presumably because the parties formed the
noncompete agreement in 1996. Id. 1 3, 2002 WL 530188, at *1.
147. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 n.3 (1987).
148. Article i, Section 10 of the United States Constitution reads:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin
a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (emphasis added).
Article 2, Section 15 of the Oklahoma Constitution reads:
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts,
shall ever be passed. No conviction shall work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of
estate: Provided, that this provision shall not prohibit the imposition of pecuniary
penalties.
OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 15 (emphasis added).
149. For an in-depth discussion of Contract Clause jurisprudence see JOHN E. NOWACK & RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.8 (5th ed. 1995); see also Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1978); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. I, 24-28
(1977).
150. 1936 OK 568, 66 P.2d 45.
151. id 12, 66 P.2d at 46.
152. Id. 13, 66 P.2d at 50 (quoting Justice Osborn in Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Barnett, 1934
OK 429, 36 P.2d 874).
20021
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Accordingly, section 219A should not affect the validity of covenants formed prior
to June 4, 2001. Not only does the language of the amendments fail to overcome the
strong presumption against retroactivity, but an interpretation of retroactivity also
would raise serious constitutional issues of the impairment of contractual obligations
in violation of Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution and article 2,
section 15 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Under fundamental canons of statutory
interpretation, an interpretation that avoids these constitutional issues, i.e., an
interpretation of prospective application only, is strongly preferred.'
VI. The Amendments Adversely Affect Businesses
by Excluding Desirable Covenants
Much of the criticism surrounding the amendments to title 15, sections 217 and
219A, relate to the types of covenants the amendments specifically invalidate."w
This criticism, however, may be unfairly directed at the recent amendments. Even
before the amendments, Oklahoma courts rarely upheld general noncompete
agreements and broadly worded non-solicitation agreements. Nevertheless, the
amendments to section 219A solidify this long-standing practice by clearly excluding
several desirable covenants.
First, while the recent amendments do allow non-solicitation agreements, they do
not allow general noncompete agreements. For example, Company A could prohibit
one of its salesmen from soliciting A's established customers when the salesman goes
to work for Competitor B. But, Company A could not prohibit the salesman from
going to work for Competitor B in a nonsales capacity, or even from working in a
sales capacity that did not solicit A's "established clients.'"5 The real problem of
this limitation is seen clearly in areas of employment that do not involve client
contact. For example, a non-solicitation agreement could not prohibit an executive
officer of Corporation A from becoming an executive officer of a competing
corporation, because executives almost never "directly solicit" clients.'" This result
is unreasonable given section 219A's apparent policy concerns of protecting against
an unfair competitive advantage gained by exposure to client information and client
relationships. '57 Surely, the concern regarding client information and relationships
would be greater with an executive than for an average employee, because an
executive has access to all client information and likely has established relationships
153. See supra note 140-141 and accompanying text.
154. Memorandum from Gary W. Derrick, Chair, Oklahoma General Corporation Act Committee
(June 27, 2001) (on file with author).
155. Id. Mr. Derrick also notes similar problems with employees such as scientists or other technical
employees who have no contact with "established customers." Id.
156. Id. Note, however, that an employer might prohibit the executive from working for a
competitor under trade secrets law. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1266-67 (7th Cir.
1995) (prohibiting an executive from working for his former employeres competitor based on the theory
that the executive would inevitably disclose the former employer's trade secrets).




with the executive officers of the former employer's clients.'5" Yet, it seems that the
recent amendments invalidate this type of covenant.
Furthermore, while specifically allowing non-solicitation agreements directed at
"established clients," the -amendments arguably invalidate several other types of
important non-solicitation agreements. The most notable are provisions that prohibit
a former employee from contacting the employees of the former employer."" This
type of "nonpiracy" provision seeks to reduce the "pied piper" phenomenon in which
several lower level employees follow a highly ranked or respected employee to a
competitor.'" While nonpiracy covenants are motivated in part by concerns beyond
the protection of client information and established relationships,"'' established
client relationships are at even greater risk when large groups of employees defect
to a competitor." Accordingly, it would be reasonable to allow this type of
agreement. However, because nonpiracy provisions are not aimed at the solicitation
of "established clients" and arguably serve to restrict competition, amended section
219A invalidates these agreements."
Finally, while the amendments provide guidance as to the permissibility of
employment noncompete agreements, they do not address several other areas in
which noncompete agreements are common." For example, the amendments do
not address noncompete agreements in association with "distributor agreements,
dealer agreements, franchise agreements, agencies, technology sharing arrangements
and joint ventures.""' There are two possibilities with regard to these types of
agreements. First, in light of the apparent intent of the amendments to return to a
more literal reading of the statutes," the amendments could invalidate these types
of agreements. However, a more plausible scenario is that courts will recognize that
the amendments in question specifically address employer-employee restrictive
covenants and no other type of restrictive covenant. With cases like NCAA, Crown
Paint, and Bayly clearly establishing a rule of reason analysis for all restrictive
158. Additionally, executives may possess nonproprietary information, such as business strategies,
that would enhance the risks of losing established clients. For example, if a departing executive left a
business only to implement identical business plans and strategies at a competitor, knowing full well that
those specific strategies ensure the loyalty of the former employer's established clients, the risks are great
that such conduct would attract at least some of these established clients.
159. Memorandum from Gary W. Derrick, supra note 155. Mr. Derrick notes the existence of
similar issues with the solicitation of vendors as well. Id.
160. Bowers et al., supra note 8 1, at 87.
161. Id
162. See Owens v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding a
noncompete agreement as reasonable under Arkansas law when an insurance agent left his employer and
took ten other insurance agents with him. These agents, in turn, encouraged their former clients to
change insurance companies).
163. See Communication Tech. Sys., Inc. v. Densmore, 583 N.W.2d 125, 128 (S.D. 1998) (holding
that South Dakota's law allowing limited non-solicitation agreements does not allow nonpiracy
agreements because the plain language of the statute only covers conduct between a former employee
and a customer, not a former employee and his employer).
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covenants in Oklahoma, if the legislature intended a complete return to a Miller-type
interpretation, it should pass a more explicit legislative directive. Until it does so, the
restraining power of judicial precedent militates against a return to Miller for
covenants outside of the employment context. Thus, Oklahoma courts should
continue to evaluate the validity of these covenants under a rule of reason ap-
proach. 6
7
Even though the amendments specifically forbid several types of noncompete
agreements, all hope is not lost. Businesses can protect sensitive information through
the use of confidentiality agreements, which the amendments arguably do not
disallow."' Further, businesses should consider using common law claims, such as
tortious interference with contractual relations, to protect interests that are unprotec-
table via noncompete agreements under the recent amendments."
VII. Conclusion
The recent amendments to title 15, sections 217 and 219A, bring some clarity to
restrictive employment covenants by aligning Oklahoma's statutory law with the
actual practice of Oklahoma courts. While the amendments do provide this higher
degree of clarity, they are only a beginning, not a sufficient ending point. The
legislature should further clarify Oklahoma law by defining terms such as "e-
stablished customers" and by making clear whether the pre-amendment duration and
geographic limitations on restrictive covenants survive the enactment of section
219A. In addition, if the legislature intended a return to a strict interpretation, like
the standard used in Miller, for restrictive covenants not directly addressed by section
219A, it should pass a clear legislative directive to Oklahoma courts to abandon the
rule of reason analysis for covenants not addressed by section 219A. Finally, the
amendments invalidate several types of restrictive employment covenants, such as
general covenants not to compete with employees who do not have contact with
clients and non-solicitation agreements that protect an employer's current workforce
and vendors, even though these covenants share many of the same policy jus-
tifications as the non-solicitation agreements permitted under section 219A. The next
undertaking of the Oklahoma legislature in the area of restrictive employment
covenants should be to address these vital issues.
Jeb Boatman
167. However, after the discussion in Part IV noting that Oklahoma courts rarely enforce true
covenants not to compete, regardless of their reasonableness, the assertion that courts should continue
to analyze all other covenants not to compete under a rule of reason approach may be more structure than
actual substance.
168. See Mai Basic Four, Inc. v. Basics Inc., 880 F.2d 286, 287-88 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that
a confidentiality agreement "cannot be characterized as [a] restrictive covenant[] and must be treated
eparate and apart from agreements not to compete"; enforcing the confidentiality agreement).
169. See Brock v. Thompson, 1997 OK 127, I 31-33, 948 P.2d 279, 293.
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